Introduction
What exactly is the role of campaign contributions? A popular view among economists is that special interest groups use contributions to buy policy favors (Becker, 1983; Grossman and Helpman, 1996) . Empirical evidence, however, is mixed. Generally, the literature has found it difficult to tackle the issue of endogeneity of campaign contributions (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder, 2003) . Another issue is that campaign contributions might be endogenous to whether they are observable to the public. If special interest groups know that campaign financing is subject to public scrutiny, they may conceal their contributions by using third parties or by helping politicians in more subtle ways. 2 This paper contributes to the literature by making three methodological innovations.
First, it uses unique firm-level data to study the effect of an unanticipated shift of political power on firm performance in Latvia, a young democracy in Eastern Europe. In October 2002 elections, the Latvian Way, one of the country's most influential political parties, failed to get re-elected by falling just 0.1 percent short of the 5 percent election threshold.
Departure of the Latvian Way was a surprise to its donors because the polls predicted strong performance throughout most of the election period. The unexpectedness of the Latvian Way's departure makes it a nearly ideal way to measure how much politicians can affect firms. Second, this paper uses a comprehensive dataset on campaign contributions that was not publicly available during the election period.
3 Furthermore, to ensure a more comprehensive coverage of contributions by business interests, it uses Business Registry data to identify all firms that contributed through their significant shareholders or board members. Third, in contrast to previous studies that focus on publicly-listed firms, this paper draws on the universe of all registered firms. In addition, panel nature of the data allows using firm fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity within the same firm over time.
There is another good reason that makes Latvia interesting to study the impact of campaign contributions. The value of political connections in Latvia is likely to be greater than in more developed countries because it is a transition economy with relatively weak democratic institutions. As a percentage of GDP, the total amount spent in the 2002 election in Latvia was about twice what was spent in the 2004 Presidential elections in U.S. 4 There is also substantial survey-based evidence of rent-seeking and corruption. Transparency International, an international corruption watchdog, has consistently ranked Latvia as one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. 5 Latvia was also characterized as a "high-capture" economy in World Bank's Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey's (BEEPS) ranking of "state capture" by special interest groups in 22 transition countries in 1999. 35 percent of surveyed firms reported being affected by "contributions by private interests to political parties and election campaigns" (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, 2000) .
This paper uses difference-in-difference method to analyze the impact of Latvian
Way's departure on sales of connected firms before and after the 2002 elections. Data on campaign contributions are merged with the Business Registry to assemble a unique dataset of 844 firms that made significant campaign contributions. Of these, 188 firms registered corporate contributions, and the rest contributed through a board member or a significant shareholder. Each contributing firm is matched to a non-contributing firm of similar size and in the same industry to create a control group.
I find that politicians have a significant impact on Latvian firms. The departure of the Latvian Way caused a firm that donated 8,000 LVL (≈$16,000, which was the average in the sample) to this party in the previous election cycle to lose 18.4% of its gross sales in the year following the election. In contrast, a firm that donated 8,000 LVL to the First Party, a rival of Latvian Way and one of the biggest (and also unexpected)
winners of the 2002 election, increased sales by 21.5%. The point estimates are consistent with the coefficients being equal and opposite. 4 The total amount spent in the 2002 election cycle (January 1 to October 5) was 3.6 million Latvian lats (1LVL ≈ 2$). For comparison, across all U.S. elections in 2004, the grand total spent is estimated to be about $4 billion (Stratmann, 2005, p. 135) . 5 On a scale 0 to 10 (10 being least corrupt), Latvia achieved a score of 4.7 in 2006, putting it in the same group with South Africa, Tunisia, and Dominica. This was an improvement as compared with 2000, when it scored 3.4 points.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. First are studies of the effect of campaign contributions on policy outcomes. Grossman and Helpman (2001) provide a thorough theoretical treatment of the issues. Empirically, most studies focus on the effect of contributions on voting by members of U.S. legislature. 6 However, there is little consensus in this literature. Some scholars view campaign contributions as investments in political marketplace, on which a rate of return is expected (e.g. Stratmann, 1998; Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998) . A competing explanation promoted by, among others, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) is that donors contribute to get their preferred candidate elected, implying that campaign contributions should be viewed as a form of consumption, rather than investment.
Second, there is a growing literature that uses micro-level datasets to study the effects of rent-seeking on firm-level outcomes (see, for example, Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2006) . These studies proxy rent-seeking by "political connections", typically defined as having a politician on a firm's board, or among shareholders, or making a campaign contribution. Most closely related to this paper are studies by Jayachandran contributions to the Republican Party. Similarly, Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2006) employ the fact that the 2000 Presidential election was a close race between Bush and Gore. They show that in response to the Republican win in the election the stock of S&P500 companies connected to the Republican Party increase in value, while companies connected to the Democratic Party decrease in value. However, both of the above studies use data on publicly-listed firms, whereas this paper uses data on all firms in Latvia. Also, in both cases the companies were well aware that their contributions may be subject of public scrutiny. In Latvia, however, data on campaign contributions were made publicly available only after 2002 election and for the first time in country's history. members, elected for a four year term by proportional representation with a 5% threshold.
Another important difference between the two countries is that whereas U.S. has a twoparty system, Latvia has about seven significant political parties. Coalition politics is important in Latvia because parliamentarian majority chooses members of the Cabinet of Ministers.
Proportional system of representation and the turbulences of transition period produced substantial instability in the political system, especially in the 1990s. Since restoration of independence in 1990 and up to 2005 there were 12 changes in the ruling coalition. In spite of frequent changes of governments and the ruling coalition, however, there was one attribute of Latvian politics that stayed relatively constant throughout the 1990s -the presence of the 'Latvian Way' party. As illustrated in Table 1 , the 'Latvian Way' has been part of every coalition government from July 1993 to November 2002 and its members held the Prime Minister's office for most of the period. In October 2002 election, however, the 'Latvian Way' won only 4.9 percent of the votes and fell short of the 5 percent threshold needed to get into the Parliament.
The 2002 election was one of the biggest turbulences in Latvia's politics, as shown in Table 2 . Two parties ('Latvian Way' and 'Social Democratic Labor Party') with large representation in the previous legislature were not re-elected at all. Two parties ('New Era' Party and 'First Party') that won more than a third of all seats in the election had zero seats in the previous legislature. 7 Essentially, the election was largely a bitter contest between the 'People's Party', closely associated with business interests of a well-known businessman, and the 'New Era Party', which ran on an anti-corruption platform. Given the election result, the only stable coalition was that of the 'New Era Party', 'First Party', They found what appeared to be a legal contract between two parties that identified themselves only by the letters "V" and "S". Observers deduced that "V" stood for Ventspils, home city of Mr. Lembergs, whereas "S" stood for social-democratic party, 
Methodology
This section discusses the specific hypotheses tested in this paper, the econometric methodology, and measurement of campaign contributions and firm performance.
Consider the following outcome equation:
where ‫ݕ‬ ௧ is the outcome of interest for firm i at time t. ‫ܦ‬ ௧ is the indicator of whether a firm made a campaign contribution, which for simplicity is assumed to be binary. Thus, ‫ܦ‬ ௧ = 1 if a firm made a campaign contribution directly or through its board member or a significant shareholder in the previous election cycle, and zero In that case, better performance following election of Farmers' Union will simply indicate that this company benefited from the party's platform, not that it receives any special benefits due to its campaign contributions. This will generate an upward bias in the estimate of ߮. Working in the opposite direction is the possibility that a firm may contribute because a rival firm has contributed (or is expected to) to a political party for the purpose of achieving preferential treatment, which will hurt other firms in its industry. Thus, a firm that expects a low draw of ‫ݑ‬ ௧ is more likely to contribute to counter rent-seeking efforts of its rivals, generating downward bias in the estimate of ߮.
11 See Schneider and Enste (2000) for quantitative estimates and a discussion of shadow economy in transition economies, including Latvia.
Clearly, endogeneity of campaign contributions needs to be controlled for to get a consistent estimate of ߮.
The fact that data on campaign contributions are only available for the 2002 election period, and not earlier, implies that there are only two periods: before and after the elections. Thus, equation (1) can be transformed by taking first differences:
where ‫ݕ∆‬ is the first difference in the logarithm of sales between the period after election and the before-election period, when campaign contribution was made. ‫ܦ‬ = 1 if a firm made a campaign contribution and zero otherwise. ∆ܺ is the first difference of firm-level covariates. This difference-in-difference specification controls for permanent unobserved heterogeneity that might be correlated with ‫ܦ‬ ௧ but does not solve endogeneity problems. Also, it is likely that campaign contribution in 2002 election cycle could be part of an ongoing relationship between politicians and a firm, but the data on contributions before 2002 are not available. This implies that some firms could be 'treated' also before the 2002 election.
To address the above issues I make use of the fact that the failure of the 'Latvian Way' and the election of the 'First Party' were unanticipated by firms that were seeking to buy political favors with campaign contributions to these two parties. Thus, the 2002 election produced exogenous changes in the strength of political connection for these firms. Consider a variant of equation (3) with party-specific contributions and industry fixed effects:
where g subscript denotes political party to which firm i contributed. ߤ is industry fixed effect, which controls for industry specific trend. My hypothesis is that firms that donated to the 'Latvian Way' experienced deterioration in their performance after the 2002 election, whereas firms that donated to the 'First Party' experienced improvement in their performance, relative to other firms in the same industries. Specifically, the hypotheses are that ߮ ௐ < 0 for firms that contributed to the 'Latvian Way', and that ߮ ௐ > 0 for firms that contributed to the 'First Party'. Given endogeneity concerns, I
have no clear predictions for the effects of contributions to other political parties.
By including industry fixed effects ߤ I mitigate the concern that changes in the performance of firms come as a result of implementation of exogenous ideology of the winning parties, and not as a result of individual campaign contributions. Implementation of election platform is likely to affect firms on an industry-wide basis, e.g. granting subsidies to agricultural firms. If a firm that gave campaign contribution benefits relative to firms that did not contribute but are in the same industry, this is likely to be a result of firm-specific political favors.
Finally, in a variation of equation (3), I replace an indicator variable ‫ܦ‬ with a continuous variable ‫ܥ‬ , which measures contribution amount to party g in thousands of
Latvian lats (1LVL ≈ 2$). If a firm contributed several times, or also through its board members and significant shareholders, ‫ܥ‬ is a sum of all these contributions in the 2002 election cycle. Equation (3) 
where ‫ݕ‬ ௧ is log of sales of firm i sales in year t; ; ‫ݔ‬ ௧ is a vector of firm-level control (4) is estimated using OLS with year and firm fixed effects, and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level.
All models are estimated with dummy variables for the first and last years of a firm's operations to control for the possibility that the firm could have been operating for less than full year.
Data and Summary Statistics
This section describes the sources of the data, the process of matching firms to politicians and donors, matching of connected firms to their matched peers, and provides some descriptive statistics. Although, in principle, these were available upon request, obtaining these data in practice is hard. All our efforts to obtain data on campaign contributions prior to January 1 st 2002 from the State Revenue Service were futile. 15 To make sure that the algorithm worked correctly, we began by matching 53 randomly selected donors to firms by hand, using Lursoft's online database. These hand-collected data were then compared to the data produced by the algorithm to identify any differences and make corrections to the algorithm when necessary. When the data produced by the algorithm perfectly matched hand-collected data, we used the algorithm to do the matching for remaining donors and politicians. 16 The main rationale for excluding banks was that it would probably be impossible to match to a nonconnected bank. Not only are the Latvian banks relatively few but most likely all of them seek political influence in one way or the other. c. Matching to non-connected firms
Unfortunately, using the data on all firms in the estimation was not possible because of sensitive nature of the data. 19 Thus, this paper proceeds using the simplest possible matching techniques. 20 For every connected firm, a match is sought in the whole universe of registered firms, except firms that were already identified as politically connected. 21 A necessary eligibility condition is that a potential match must be active in the years that a connected firm was active and operate in the same industry. Matching is done in 2001 -the year preceding the campaign contribution. For each connected firm, a match is identified among all the firms meeting eligibility requirements (not connected, active in the period, same industry) using the nearest-neighbor matching in terms of assets.
Another necessary condition is that the difference between assets of the connected firms and it matched peer should not exceed 40% of the assets of connected firm. 22 Matching is done without replacement. When identifying all potential matches in the same industry we begin with the primary 4-digit NACE classification, assigned by the Latvian Central Statistical Bureau. If no company satisfies these criteria, the process is repeated at 3-digit NACE, and then at 2-digit NACE.
I now report the results of matching connected firms to their peers. After removing firms with missing industry classification, 878 firms were submitted for matching and 844 firms were successfully matched. Most firms (759) were matched at the four digit NACE level, 43 firms -at the three digit level, 42 firms -at the two digit level, and no matches could be identified for 34 firms. The most popular activities of donating firms are "wholesale trade" (11%), "real estate" (10%), "other business activities" (10%), "retail trade" (10%), and "construction" (7%).
d. Descriptive Statistics
In this section I report descriptive statistics for the datasets on contributing firms and their matched peers. however, became smaller in absolute terms in the year after the election. As it was already mentioned, interpreting differences in return on assets is difficult because of widespread tax evasion. One interpretation is that firms that did poorly were more likely to give campaign contributions. Another possible interpretation, however, is that firms that contributed found it easier to underreport profits.
Empirical Results
In this section I provide results of my empirical analysis. Table 5 (3) and (4) provide partial support for my hypothesis. The coefficient for donating to the 'Latvian Way' is negative and statistically significant in both specifications. The coefficient for donating to the 'First Party' is positive but not statistically significant.
In regressions (5) and (6) I subject my main result to a more detailed analysis by focusing on loyal donors, i.e. firms that contributed exclusively to one party. In these specifications firms that contributed to more than one party are classified as having donated to "other parties". In regression (5) I replicate the results in Regression (3), and in Regression (6) I replicate the results in Regression (4). The main result is that the estimated coefficient of donating to the 'Latvian Way' increases in magnitude and statistical significance. According to regression (6), a firm that contributed only to the 'Latvian Way' experienced a decrease in sales by nearly 30%, substantially more than firms that diversified their contributions. On the other hand, the coefficient for donating to the 'New Era' party dropped in magnitude and became statistically insignificant.
Summing up, loyal donors that gave to the 'Latvian Way' suffered more than donors that contributed to other parties. However, there is no evidence that loyal donors to the 'First Party' gained in sales in the after-election year.
Next, in regressions (7) and (8) In Table 5 Regressions (6), (7), and (8) replicate the results in Regressions (3), (4), and (5), respectively, using this new dependent variable. The estimated coefficient on donations to the 'Latvian Way' is negative and statistically significant at 5% and 10% in
Regressions (6) and (7), respectively. The magnitude of the effect is greater than in the previous regressions. According to Regression (7) In Regression (1), the dependent variable is log sales growth in 1999. The estimated coefficient for donating of 0.14 is statistically significant, implying that in these years donors' growth of sales was 14% higher compared to their matched peers. Interaction term with having donated to the three main parties in the ruling coalition is negative and insignificant. These results are not changed in Regression (2) Apart from building on a quasi-experiment provided by the departure of the 'Latvian Way', the unique contribution of this paper is that it focuses on a period when donors did not suspect that their contributions will become subject to public scrutiny, and that it also accounts for contributions of firms' board members and shareholders. As a result, this paper provides new evidence on the value of political connections in transition economies. It also corroborates other evidence that firms derive rents from connections with politicians and that campaign contributions is one of the channels through which businesses pay for political favors. This paper also suggests that changes in the distribution of political power cause changes in the distribution of economic rents among connected firms. 10. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) + ߚܺ ௧ + ߙ + ߝ ௧ , where ‫ݕ‬ ௧ is log of sales of firm i sales in year t; ; ‫ݔ‬ ௧ is a vector of firm-level control variables; ‫ܥ‬ , is donation sum of firm i to party g in the 2002 election (݆ = 1, . . ‫;)ܯ‬ ߙ is a firm fixed effect; and ݀03 ௧ , ݀04 ௧ , ݀05 ௧ are year fixed effects for 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively . Each reported coefficient estimate is the interaction between donation to a party and the year. All donations are on the firm level and in thousands of 2000 Latvian lats (1LVL ≈ 2$). Dummy variables for the first and last years of operations are included in all regressions, but these are not reported. Control variables are log of assets and leverage, but these are not reported here. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
